Episode 4. NATO: How US Military & US Diplomats Partnered On Russia/Ukraine & Disinformation

Episode Transcript:

Amb. McCarthy: [00:00:00] From the American Academy of Diplomacy. This is the General and the Ambassador. Our podcast brings together senior US diplomats and senior US military leaders in conversations about their partnership to advance American interests overseas. My name is Ambassador Deborah McCarthy and I'm the producer and host of the series. Our guests are General Philip Breedlove and Ambassador Victoria Nuland, two of our most senior and decorated public servants. When General Breedlove served as the commander of the US European Command and as the Supreme Allied commander of NATO from 2013 to 2016, Ambassador Nuland was Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State. Bill and Toria developed a close working partnership at a time when both NATO and Europe faced enormous challenges requiring strong US leadership. So let's start with Russia, a country that is much talked about today. We have some mechanisms to work with Russia on issues of mutual interest, both on the diplomatic side and the military side. How important are these channels and how did you work them either individually or together?

Gen. Breedlove: [00:01:22] Well, for me, it started individually because frankly, we didn't know each other all that well before I started. And and I was focused on a different problem set when I took my command on the NATO side. And that was how the mission in Afghanistan was going to change how we were going to move from the combat mission of ISAF to the new mission as we draw down. But as fate or history would have it, Russia began raising its head. And I think that the first thing I recognized was that I was going to need help and I needed help in a couple of ways. One from my DOD military side. But secondarily, I needed to understand where our nation was in a policy sense and certainly where Department of State was. As I began to have to connect to the ambassadors on the ground. And then so I sort of connect to Victoria via that.

Amb. Nuland: [00:02:29] So just to say that Phil Breedlove was a spectacular partner, we were lucky enough to overlap almost completely in terms of the time that he was commander of US forces Europe and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, NATO, and I was assistant secretary. We shared the same 50 countries. I think he had a couple more than than I did.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:02:53] Almost complete overlap.

Amb. Nuland: [00:02:54] Exactly. So as as Phil has already said, his job was to talk to ministers of defense chiefs of defense in those countries, to talk to the NATO military side, my job was to talk to and support my bosses in talking to foreign ministers, heads of state, and to manage all of our embassies, 50 embassies on the ground. So both in terms of the messages that we were sending to our allies and partners across that territory, but also in terms of the policy recommendations that we were making in Washington, we both understood from the beginning that we'd be more effective if we were completely in sync in terms of what we were doing. And as Phil said, that started well before we faced what certainly was one of the most tense and consequential periods of my career and I would guess of Phil's. So we were lucky enough that we had this trust, we had this partnership, we had this agreement that we would work together to the extent that we could well before we hit the crisis moment when we really needed each other.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:04:04] And you had your own established channels of communication, how did that work?

Gen. Breedlove: [00:04:08] So so we sort of built those. And it started for me because I was having a bit of a disconnect as I would talk to the embassies on the ground and then I would go back at night via VTC or occasionally in person to the DCs in Washington. And I saw, wow, there are this this approach is not well oiled between and I found a great ally. And I think that frankly from the first we saw that our approach was very similar. We were almost completely aligned in the way we felt about things. Now, clearly we both represented different entities and occasionally those things are going to bump into each other structurally. But then it is the relationship that fixes the structural problems, and that's what we had. And the other thing is, frankly, if I can get off the subject for a minute, I'm a fighter pilot. I deal directly with people and problems. I'm not rude, but I just sort of go at things and get them out there. And I think she's of the same ilk. She never pulled a punch with me and I didn't have to worry whether I was getting colored approach to.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:05:19] So was frank communication?

Gen. Breedlove: [00:05:20] Absolutely. Very frank and open communication.

Amb. Nuland: [00:05:23] So just in terms of the technical piece, I think we both directed our staffs to work really intensely together. So we had situational awareness of what the other one was working on. But then we very quickly established direct contact. We would either have a video conference or a secure call, you know, a couple times a month or before a big meeting so that we were well aligned and, you know, we needed each other for full awareness anyway. You know, Phil was out in Europe and he had the real sense of the ground and what allies were thinking better than I did, frankly. And it augmented what I was hearing from embassies. I was sitting in Washington in the interagency, closer to colleagues in the White House, closer to colleagues, even in his headquarters. So I was often able to help him understand what the range of policy that the President was willing to consider would be. And we were also both working contacts on the Hill. His were more on the defense side, mine were more on the foreign policy side, and we were both out in public as well trying to create interest in what we were doing in the first instance and then some commitment on the part of the United States to help when the Ukraine crisis began.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:06:40] I think so, too. I hate to interrupt, but I think that it's powerful in DC when the decision making apparatus in the form of the DCs, PCs, NSC and that sort of thing, when they see a strong bond between the voice of the Department of State and Department of Defense, it's extremely helpful, especially when there are strong voices in the other part of the government that may not be absolutely aligned with what we had.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:07:11] Well, let's talk about Ukraine, which which Toria mentioned and the challenge that that posed when Russia went in and annexed Crimea. It posed many challenges, obviously to the US and to Europe. There were diplomatic and military components to the US response. How what? What? Did each of you focus on and how did you work individually and together again on this issue?

Gen. Breedlove: [00:07:34] So my first focus was not obvious to folks who followed the history, and that was that there was a lot of voices in Europe and a few, frankly, in our own capital that were not seeing what was happening in Crimea the way that we saw it, that, you know, the green men well, are they Russians, Are they not Russians? You know, and frankly, some entities chose sides based on not having to face the policy decisions that would have to come from admitting the Russians were in Crimea. And so for me, getting all of us in Europe and then we didn't ever have any disagreement, but getting all of our institutions in America to accept what the reality of what the reality of what was going on on the ground was one of my first and hardest things to do. People were choosing the Intel and interpreting it the way they wanted to interpret to keep them clear of tough policy decisions.

Amb. Nuland: [00:08:36] I would just say that I think probably based on our respective experiences, fills in understanding military movements and strategic intent, mine in terms of understanding Russian decision making and how they deploy and think we were ahead of the intelligence community in Washington. We were ahead of the policymakers in believing that it that that Russia might actually jump into Crimea and seize it. We had a lot of trouble then and we had even more trouble later when they went into eastern Ukraine because we didn't have the intelligence assets that we needed to prove what we what we knew was coming. The and Putin was doing a very good job of deception, obfuscation, an et cetera. So the first thing that we sought and we sought it together was more aerial capability so that we could get a picture of the Russians deploying of them, moving stuff. And we sought that for Crimea. And then later we sought it for Donbas.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:09:48] To give everybody a clear picture of exactly what was happening there.

Amb. Nuland: [00:09:51] To blunt the deception and to ensure that US and allied policy was based on facts. And and really, it was the first time well, it wasn't the first time, I guess in Georgia they tried it, but on that mass scale that they had moved but claimed for so long that they weren't. So that was our first challenge together, was to get a realistic picture on which policy could be based.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:10:15] We have to give a little bit of credit to the Russians. They learned from their mistakes in Georgia, and they were better at the masking and the deception in Crimea. And but we eventually and I agree completely, we were pretty straightforward in what we thought was going on. And the community came along to that a little later. They learned from that and got better in Donbas. And then, you know, again, we went through this problem of getting everyone to understand what we saw happening on the ground in the Donbas.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:10:45] And how did you work this information to walk our interagency through the policy options of what the US should do about invasion of Ukraine and occupation of Crimea?

Amb. Nuland: [00:10:57] I think the first loop that we had to go through together and this is always the case for the general and the ambassador for the admiral and the ambassador, depending upon who's in command, is was there a military tool that the US should use? What was the range of option? And I think we were lucky enough to have the trust by that time that we could talk privately about that before we had to go into the US policy community. So the options ranged from the massive should the US engage militarily itself on behalf of the Ukrainians with all of the risks and responsibilities that would come with that? Should we simply assist the Ukrainians? And if so, would it be on the non-lethal side, on the lethal side? Should we just try to provide more intelligence and training? And then there was the question of the NATO alliance itself, because if you have Russians moving from east to west, how far are they going to go and what does it mean about those countries that we had pledged to defend and protect? So I think we were lucky enough that by the time we went into the interagency process with options, we were very well aligned that we, in that first instance did not believe that the traffic would bear becoming co combatants ourselves. But we very much wanted to help the Ukrainians defend themselves. We wanted to have more clarity about what was happening on the battlefield As much as we could get to inform the conversation we were having with allies and we wanted to mount the strongest possible defense and deterrent in the NATO space so that we wouldn't have to have Moscow tempted to go all the way.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:12:51] And once again, not to to get too basic, but to remember, I like to talk to people about how the deputies committee and the NSC committee table is set up and at the head of the table is is either the national security adviser or one of the deputy national security advisors and to his or her immediate right and left are DOD and Dos. And so think of the dynamics that at a table when we're talking about pretty weighty issues of whether we're going to use a more fulsome military approach or some hybrid blend of of other elements of statecraft and military, when the head of the table is already understood and sort of agreed where we are and has a combined way ahead, it's really helpful in the in the policy world doesn't always get you what you think you need, but it's really helpful when that dynamic is settled, even before a meeting.

Amb. Nuland: [00:13:50] I think the other thing was that we were also looking at non-military tools. We were already looking at the tool of sanctions and economic coercion. So I was able to fill fill in on all of that. So he knew that he was coming into a meeting where there would be a full suite of of of tools under discussion and that we could present them as a package first to the deputies, then to the principals, and then ultimately in the National Security Council meetings that happened in March and April.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:14:21] And not not captured in this discussion because we were focused more on the US. But for me, what that did was I was going to NACs NATO Atlantic Council meetings at the ambassadorial level and above in person and I could armed with where we thought we should be and what we should do in these other tools of government. That's what NATO wanted to talk about first. And so that was very helpful. And Toria would come over when the when when the the secretary of state would come over for their ministerial meetings and she would then be able to do it in person as well. But what she armed me with allowed me on a day to day basis to at least help the US mission. The ambassador, Doug Lute at the time and others to work the table at the NAC to try to get to where our policy makers in DC were headed.

Amb. Nuland: [00:15:20] And of course Doug worked with me as well. So the idea was to create a solid alignment and also to get the feedback loop as to what the traffic would bear among the Europeans in response.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:15:31] Let me turn to something else now, which is our military presence in Europe. I mean, obviously the footprint is much smaller than it was in the Cold War. What's the importance of this military presence in Europe and how does it make the US more secure?

Gen. Breedlove: [00:15:48] Well, so two seconds of reminiscing. When Captain Phil Breedlove first went to Europe, having served there eight times before I retired. When Captain Phil Breedlove went there and give us a year, 1983. Long time ago. Of course, there was a massive American force. You know, the numbers vary on how you count them, but 400,000 plus people, ten fighter wings, two entire cores, plus additional army forces. And I was there as a fighter pilot first and then second on the ground with the Army as an air liaison officer and tactical air control party. So our presence there. Of course, during the Warsaw Pact days and the time of the Cold War was everybody understood that what that was? Absolutely. After that, it's much tougher. And frankly, for reasons that I completely understand, in hindsight, I don't think they were right. But we took a big peace dividend, you know, And when I was serving there as the commander of EUCOM, we had two brigades not two corps cause.

Amb. Nuland: [00:16:56] Tell people how many two brigades is.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:16:58] Is well, two brigades is maybe 20,000 people with all the attendant additional. So so it's tiny compared to what we had. And from ten fighter wings to two and a half fighter wings and and the same thing with the Navy down to really only five ships assigned to Europe at this day and time. And so but let's get back to your original question. Our presence is important. I am unabashed that our ability to remain connected, to show a certain commitment via presence, and frankly, to show a commitment to a potential adversary that, yes, we are still here is incredibly important. And frankly, I think there's more work to be done here. I applaud what we got done in Wales. I applaud even though I walked out three days before Warsaw, I prepped for Warsaw and I applaud.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:17:56] That was a very important meeting.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:17:57] It was. And so the things that we set in place, the NATO.

Amb. Nuland: [00:18:01] Summit in the summer of 2016 that consolidated NATO's decision to augment in the Baltic states and in Poland.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:18:09] What we did there.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:18:10] Which I can attest to, having been in Lithuania, was deeply appreciated.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:18:15] So I was just in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Belgium 11 days ago, and we're still talking about how this presence for this extended forward presence or enhanced forward presence sorry, let me correct myself, is important to these nations.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:18:34] It makes a huge difference.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:18:35] Commitment to our allies and a commitment that our potential opponents can see.

Amb. Nuland: [00:18:41] It's key. I'd also say that, you know, you remember why we stay in Europe after World War Two. It's to provide that security under which the Europeans are able to rebuild and become prosperous, strong partners in their own right. But by the time we get down to the level of force that General Breedlove finds when he's secure it, that small footprint does three things. First of all, it allows us to have a regular set of forces land, sea and air that we train with the Europeans so that if we do need to work together, we're ready. And wherever.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:19:23] That may be, we can work together.

Amb. Nuland: [00:19:24] Second, it provides that small footprint that if we ever did need to fight in Europe, we can fall in on. You can't start from a cold start if you have to, which is why when we decide that Russia might threaten the eastern edge of the alliance, we decide we need some fall in footprint out there, too. But the third piece is we then end up with bases and relationships in many European countries that allow us to go to further flung places, whether it's Afghanistan or whether it's Africa or whether it's Iraq. For those who went with us and those who are now training Iraqis with us to operate from. So it really is an important part of the knitting of the relationship. And on the political and diplomatic side, it provides that constant reassurance that we are in this together. And when we ask Europeans to work with us on global problems, they know that we haven't abandoned Mission one and they're more willing to do it.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:20:35] And I think it's worth remembering not all think about it, but it's also a down payment on the interoperability and the the fact that we're committed to them, but they're also committed to us. A lot of Americans forget that the only time Article five has ever been invoked is for the defense of America when we were attracted nine divided by 11, our NATO. Allies invoked Article five and went to Afghanistan with us and out of theater experience that many thought NATO would never do.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:21:06] Well, I recall when I was ambassador in Lithuania and I went out to see the PRT that the Lithuanians had with us. It was as a result of the relationship we had built in Europe to go outside. Well, I wanted to turn to a third issue, which is we're seeing such a serious challenge to democratic governance along the eastern frontiers of Europe. Civil society is under under severe pressure. Corruption is a major problem. Why is it important for the US to stay engaged in in that region? What is the value to America?

Amb. Nuland: [00:21:41] So to remind every country that was admitted to NATO after its original founding had to make reforms in order to be democratic enough, free enough, open enough, including in the way it managed its military, had to institute civilian control of the military in order to be admitted to this liberal Democratic family. So some of the countries that we see rolling back those reforms now, Hungary, Czech Republic, even in Poland, Turkey, forget that the price of membership was to have open societies, to have alternation of power, to respect the judicial systems in their countries, to respect the fourth estate, the free media. So that is a real worry when the terms of the contract are actually not being upheld.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:22:42] And can I take just a little different? I want to get on a soapbox I climb up on a little bit once in a while because Toria had described it perfectly. A lot of people throw out these terms about NATO expansionism and NATO expanding, and it sounds like NATO is you know, they make it sound like NATO's been out there trying to do a land grab in Eastern Europe. And I remind exactly, as Toria described, that, that the path for these nations into NATO is tortuous. For some of them. It was hard and NATO didn't go out and say, we want you in. And and.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:23:20] Then they had to.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:23:20] They were asking to be in and fighting to be in. And so I, I bristle just a little bit. It may be the fighter pilot in me, but I bristle a little bit when people throw out these terms about NATO expansionism out because I saw how hard it was to get our newest member in and frankly judge me if you want. I believe Georgia has earned in a military sense, there's other things that need to be worked. But Georgia has earned their right to be a part of NATO.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:23:54] And they will continue to knock on that door.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:23:55] Exactly. And that's how torture it is to get into the alliance. And Tori has it very correct. There's they made hard changes to do to get to where they are. And it is something we've now got to work on, not to lose some of these hard fought changes.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:24:12] Let's turn now a little bit to how you got into your career, your chosen career. Fields Toria, what made you choose to become a diplomat?

Amb. Nuland: [00:24:22] So I fell in love with all things Russian after seeing a Chekhov play when I was 13. I started then reading Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, and then, of course, I had to learn the language. And the next thing I wanted to understand, because it was the Soviet period, was how it was that this amazingly rich culture and people were so strangely governed. And then I got into the politics and then I started doing Russian, and I graduated from from school in high Reagan. There wasn't a lot you could do with Russian. There weren't a lot of companies that were that were trading in those days. You could go to the CIA, but that did not seem like the right path for me. So I took I took the Foreign Service exam. I was working my first job at a school. I was working for a member of Congress who didn't know much about foreign policy. At 23, I did his foreign policy as defense policy As intelligence policy. My goodness. And then I got a chance to to actually use my Russian in practice. In those days, the Soviets used to send their their fish factory ships into our easy. And I went out and lived and worked on one of those factory ships representing the American company. I took a leave of absence from my congressman. Wow. Took a leave of absence from my congressman, said, I'll come back and help you with your campaign in the fall if you let me have this experience. Lived on a Soviet fishing trawler with 80 Russian men. They taught me all my all my navigation, all my stores, all my Russian curses.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:25:52] I say probably some colorful Russian language.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:25:54] My father was in the Merchant Marine. Yes, they can. Certainly.

Amb. Nuland: [00:25:57] Exactly. I always blame my salty language on the fact that it started with the Russians when I was 23. But I got off that ship and collected seven months of mail and in there was an invitation from the Foreign Service. So I thought, okay, this will be a lark. I'll do this for about 4 or 5 years, and then I'll go back to graduate school. And every assignment was more fun than the next. And so 32 years later, here we go.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:26:24] And Phil, what made you join the Air Force?

Gen. Breedlove: [00:26:26] So I have never heard that. And I have learned something about a dear friend of mine now that I'll treasure for a long time. But some real similarities, but then some some less altruistic approaches. So I. Came from a very wonderful, loving family. But my father had a fifth grade education and and was a blue collar worker. And he went to work for a really small company back then, this tiny, tiny little company called Delta Airlines. And he had he had self-taught avionics and he went to work as a blue collar worker. So as a young preteen and then teen, the same thing. I was doing a lot of reading. I loved to read, and I began reading all these books in our local library about aviation, World War One fighter pilots, Richthofen and Becker, you know, and World War Two and all of that. And I just became between my father working for Delta and reading about aviation. I knew from, I think 12 or 13 I wanted to be a pilot.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:27:28] That's a young age to do that.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:27:30] But my but my approach was not so pure. I my plan was because the best education in flying was in the military was to go to the military, serve my requirement and get out and fly for Delta. A bit similar. Once I got into the business and I started military flying and the first time I got to command other airmen and the first time I got to do my job for real as a fighter pilot and there was nothing else for me. And each job got better. Each job was more rewarding. And I must say that my Air Force brothers and sisters will probably cringe. But I love my Air Force and I love what I got to do in my Air Force. But later in life, I became much more of a joint officer and I got to work with the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and I commanded soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. And then later in life, I got to learn about my State Department and other brethren. I must admit I made few really strong friends outside of state in the rest of the government, but I still count people from my associations in state as among my dearest because we slept. We sweat some blood and tears together, frankly. And we took some skin knuckles and wrapped foreheads together a couple of times.

Amb. Nuland: [00:28:51] We bear some scars together, some scars, but we also both deeply loved serving our country. And it's it's quite addictive once you get into it.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:29:01] And I love a nation where you can present your opinion even when you know it may not be well received. You're not responsible for the decisions that are taken from what you offer.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:29:12] But you offer your best.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:29:12] Advice you can offer your best advice. And in almost all the time it is respected and considered. And that's all you can ask for.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:29:22] And what would you tell young diplomats and young military officers today on the importance of building a relationship between them in order to better protect our country?

Amb. Nuland: [00:29:34] Start young Because you never know when you're going to be in command together.

Gen. Breedlove: [00:29:38] One of the best state, best and first state friends I had was with me when I was a lieutenant colonel at National War College in school, and he was my first exposure to what State Department did. And what I would tell officers is what I tell the young brigadiers when I'm a mentor to Capstone, which is the school we send our young brigadiers to, and I start talking to them early about, here's what you need to do with your ambassadors, here's what you need. You got to go tell them I'm on the team. You lead the team in this nation. I lead a larger team, but I can help you. And my promise has always been very straightforward. I'm going to stay inside your headlights. Because if I'm operating outside of your headlights, I'm not helping the goal of this mission in this nation. And so I would just tell him, you got to get plugged in early. And it's all about building a trust relationship.

Amb. Nuland: [00:30:34] And communicate, communicate, communicate. We didn't let much time go between our phone calls and when one of us called the other, it was answered immediately.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:30:52] My guest today were General Philip Breedlove and Ambassador Victoria Nuland. The program, the general and the ambassador is a project of the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Una Chapman Cox Foundation. You can find us on all podcast sites. We urge listeners to send us feedback and suggestions for future episodes. You can reach us at General.Ambassador.podcast@gmail.com and our website is GeneralAmbassadorPodcast.Org. Thank you so much for listening.