Episode 15. Libya & The Responsibility To Protect: General Ham & Ambassador Cretz On US Actions To Protect The Libyan Population From Gaddafi

Additional Resources:

New York Times: At U.S. embassy-in-exile, anguished diplomats watch Libyan conflict

Episode Transcript:

Amb. McCarthy: [00:00:13] Our podcast brings together senior US diplomats and senior US military leaders in conversations about their partnerships in tackling some of our toughest national security challenges. I am Ambassador Deborah McCarthy, the producer and host of the series. Today our focus will be on Libya. Specifically, we'll talk about the role of the US military and US diplomats after the 2011 uprising of the Libyan population against the dictatorship of Colonel Gaddafi. We'll also discuss the US and international military and diplomatic campaign that helped protect the Libyan people and lay the bases for the transition to a new government. Our guests are General Carter Ham and Ambassador Gene Cretz. General Ham, you served as the ambassador of the US Africa Command from 2011 to 2013. Previously, you were the commanding general of US Army Europe, Director of Operations at the Joint Staff and commanding General of the first Infantry Division. You're currently the President, CEO of the Association of the United States Army. Ambassador Cretz, you were the first US Ambassador to be sent to Libya in over 35 years, arriving in 2008. Prior to Libya, you were the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. And after Libya you went on to serve as US Ambassador to Ghana and now you are a representative to the director of the Multinational Force, which seeks to implement the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Gentlemen, let's jump in. In 2011, across most of North Africa, uprisings and political movements were taking place to depose long serving dictators and presidents. This was called the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, a vegetable vendor set himself on fire in December 2010. This led to an uprising which forced the long standing dictator into exile. The wave of revolt then spread across other countries. In February 2011, protests began in Libya, where Colonel Gaddafi had ruled for 41 years. Gaddafi struck back with brutal force, dispatching troops and using aircraft to launch raids against civilians. People began fleeing the country. I want to start with you, Ambassador Cretz. You were the ambassador at the time of the uprising. Who exactly were the groups or tribes that rose up and why?

Amb. Cretz: [00:02:38] For the major part of Gaddafi's rule, He had a real hatred for the eastern part of the country, which of which Benghazi was the center. This related to the fact that he and a group of his fellow soldiers had overthrown King Idris Senussi back in 1969. He just despised the people in the East. And for all of his reign, he really starved the area, even though it was an oil rich area. He had committed several atrocities against people there, and it was really the hotbed for the years that Gaddafi was in rule of any opposition to him. First, nobody would have predicted that there would have been an uprising in Libya. I can guarantee you that. I spoke to hundreds of people during before and after the revolution. And I found one person actually who said that they thought that what happened in Tunisia and what happened in Egypt would happen in Libya. The initial actually spark for the uprising against Gaddafi was the arrest of a lawyer who was representing hundreds of families of Libyans whose sons, daughters and relatives had disappeared at a massacre that took place at a prison called Abu Salim many years before. And once that happened, that was the spark that did it, and then it spread to the rest of the country after that.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:03:54] General Ham, you were transitioning from being commander of US Army Europe to being commander of AFRICOM, which covers Libya. How was the US military viewing this situation in Libya and in the region?

Gen. Ham: [00:04:06] When I arrived at United States Africa Command formally on the 9th of March of 2011, if you had told me that day that ten days following that the United States military would be leading combat operations in Libya, I would have looked at you like you had something growing out of your forehead, just wasn't in our consciousness. We certainly were aware of the unrest that was resulting from the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening. My predecessor, General Kip Ward, had the foresight to recognize that the unrest, the uncertainty of the situation in North Africa was likely to lead or would possibly lead to some kind of military action. And so he he had formed what in the military we call a joint task force, a military command specifically focused on the region to look at possible contingencies. Frankly, we weren't considering as a high likelihood the conduct of combat operations. Rather, we thought more likely would be the evacuation of American diplomats, American citizens and what the US military and the State Department called a non-combatant evacuation. How do you get American citizens and often the citizens of allied countries out of a dangerous situation in difficult circumstances? We were more focused on that kind of an operation. But then as the situation evolved and we saw the marshaling of Libyan armed forces essentially encircling to the degree that you can a coastal city, but threatening the civilian population, a vulnerable population in Benghazi, when we saw that military capability matched with the language that was coming out of Mr. Gaddafi and his government. I think that's what spurred the United Nations and ultimately the United States government to take action to protect those civilians.

Amb. Cretz: [00:06:02] I would also add that at the same time, from the perspective of the State Department, there was tremendous reluctance at that particular point to consider military action. When Secretary of State Clinton met with Mahmoud Jibril for the first time, who was the leader of the Transitional National Council in Paris just a day or two before the actual United Nations Security Council resolution. I think she left that meeting with a sense that this really was something that the United States should pursue. But I'm not positive that she was absolutely convinced at that moment. It was events over the next few days, I think that changed the State Department and obviously under the leadership of President Obama, for us to take the next step toward joining our French and British colleagues in a military adventure.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:06:45] Well, before we get to the military operation, I want to talk a little bit about the evacuation of Americans, something you spoke about, General, as well. We decided to close the embassy and evacuate Americans. They went out by ferry. They went out by plane. How was this evacuation handled? What coordination took place between State Department, Department of Defense? Sometimes I know state takes the lead on these evacuations. Sometimes we work with the Department of Defense. It varies depending on the situation.

Amb. Cretz: [00:07:10] I had been forced to leave Libya in December of 2010 between Christmas and New Year's because of the exposure of Wikileaks that took place and the tremendous amount of information, sensitive information about the Libyan leader, his family and things that went on in Libya. And so there was a basically a direct threat to my life. So Secretary Clinton. And decided to pull me out. So I thought that was the end of my experience in Libya, because obviously I couldn't go back as long as Gaddafi was still there. So the actual evacuation was handled by our chargé d'affaires, Joan Polaschik, in coordination with our Undersecretary of management, Pat Kennedy. At the time. It was an interagency, as it always is, an interagency effort, including the renting of a boat from Malta and then also a chartered plane to come in and get the rest of our people to conclude the evacuation effort. And as you.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:08:01] Went back to Washington, you sort of reconstituted the embassy and with the knowledge of your team of the country. How did this feed into the decision making process that was taking place?

Amb. Cretz: [00:08:10] The greater bulk of the staff was back in Washington. So we were given space in Navy Hill and also in the department. And so we were able, in effect, to constitute what we called the embassy on the Potomac and throughout the uprising, based upon the knowledge that we had of people, our contacts and of the country, we were in constant communication with people on the ground. In fact, I had been communicating with several of the generals in Benghazi who were conducting the operation, and in effect, Gaddafi had eavesdropped and was playing the tapes of my communicating with these generals, asking them how the situation was, what they needed. Et cetera. It was very fortunate because we were then able to feed directly into the interagency process for the secretary and the president various day to day reports. It was a good step and a lucky step on our behalf to be able to reconstitute that embassy there.

Gen. Ham: [00:09:01] And as Ambassador Cretz said, while the majority of the embassy staff were either reassigned or brought to Washington, several of the military officers who had worked in the embassy, the attachés, were dispersed to the military headquarters to include at the United States Africa Command headquarters, which proved very, very beneficial, not only in terms of communication with Ambassador Cretz and his staff here in Washington, but also because, frankly, Libya was not a country to which United States, Africa Command or the United States military writ large had paid much attention. We did not have great understanding of the country, of the people, of the government, of the armed forces. So having those military attachés resident in the military headquarters that were considering and developing options was very, very useful.

Amb. Cretz: [00:09:49] And I would add that there was a specific individual at the time, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Linville, who was the defense attache with me in Libya for two years. He was absolutely indispensable, helping to set the stage for contacts with the Libyan military during our time before the revolution. And so afterwards, I think he proved invaluable to General Ham and his staff while he was in Stuttgart.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:10:13] Well, pressure was mounting to do something. I know the French and the British and others were pushing for a no fly zone. Can you explain what a no fly zone is to our listeners from.

Gen. Ham: [00:10:22] From a military standpoint, While it sounds quite simple, a no fly zone, you simply say, well, we'll issue orders and directives to all parties that say, you may not operate aircraft in the designated space and there will be armed aircraft to enforce that no fly zone. So if there are violators, then they can be appropriately dealt with, either shouldered as the military term is, and escorted out of the area or potentially attacked. It sounds rather pristine and almost antiseptic in implementation. But the first step in imposing a no fly zone is ensuring that there is no or at least minimal threat to the forces that are flying above the country to affect the no fly zone. What that means in practical terms is the initial steps are to eliminate destroy the air defense systems, the early warning systems, the command and control systems in the land over which the no fly zone is going to be implemented. This became important from my perspective as the military commander, because there were, frankly, from my perspective, people kind of tossing around this idea of a no fly zone as something that can be done relatively low cost, relatively low risk with little consequences. And it was encouraging, frankly, to see our most senior leaders, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in those interagency meetings remind people that says, hey, this is a serious undertaking. The imposition of a no fly zone begins with killing a lot of people on the ground. And so don't take this lightly. This is a very, very serious matter.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:12:02] Well, I want to turn now a little bit to the fast unfolding elements that took place in the UN. They first started by putting sanctions on Libya and referring Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court. We froze assets. The Arab League suspended Libya. Fast forward into March. We supported both those initial measures, but also a UN Security Council resolution which mandated so-called all necessary measures to protect civilians as well as the no fly zone. And this. Came under what is called the responsibility to protect the norm that calls on the international community to intervene when governments fail to safeguard their own civilians. Can you explain to our listeners what a UN Council resolution is and what it means for both US diplomatic and military actions in this context?

Amb. Cretz: [00:12:49] And most of your listeners would be familiar with the two main branches that make up the UN, the General Assembly and the Security Council. The General Assembly really doesn't have the power to order or to recommend military action on the behalf of its members, but the Security Council does, and it has various articles under which that can take place. Article seven is one in which the members of the Security Council can vote to undertake military action. And that's the article under which we and the rest of our colleagues who undertook action at that time were given kind of a framework under which to legally, under international law, take that action.

Gen. Ham: [00:13:26] From a military perspective, the United Nations Security Council resolution was important, as Ambassador Cretz has indicated from a legal perspective, from the underpinnings of international law, to authorize the use of force. But in and of itself, a United Nations Security Council resolution does not direct or order US military forces into action, nor the military forces of any other nation. Those are independent decisions made by sovereign nations and so resulting from the United Nations Security Council resolution all measures necessary to protect civilians. Then that was translated into a decision by the commander in chief, the president, President Obama, through the secretary of defense and the secretary of defense, then issuing what we in the military call execution orders. That is the legal direction where the secretary of defense ordered me as the commander of United States Africa Command to commence military operations, the main part of which was to protect civilians. There was an arms embargo there, a maritime exclusion zone. But the key element of the order implementing the United Nations Security Council resolution was the all means to protect civilians in particularly the threatened population in and around Benghazi.

Amb. Cretz: [00:14:46] And I would add that the as General Ham said, that the decision to undertake such military action is a very serious one. And I was just fortunate enough to be in one of the meetings that took place. I was in Paris at the time with Secretary Clinton and she had left for Egypt. And so I was asked to participate in one of the final meetings where the discussion was taking place, inter-agency with all of the main players of influence in our government. And I can tell you just from that one experience, it was not a decision that was lightly taken. But eventually I think the president listened to a lot of people around the table and was convinced that it was the right thing to do. And at that point, Ambassador Susan Rice was asked to work on the resolution that would allow this to take place.

Gen. Ham: [00:15:27] I'd echo that comment. And again, participating mostly by video teleconference secure means from our headquarters in Stuttgart. It was difficult. There were challenges. There were strongly held views and opinions by the most senior leaders in the government, offering their views, their perspectives and their recommendations. And I think that's what we want. I think that's ideal that in a difficult situation, and particularly when we are talking about a decision teed up for the president to make a decision whether or not to commit US military forces, I think that wide ranging set of views, a wide ranging set of recommendations, certainly no unanimity. And ultimately all eyes turned to the president. And the president has to make a difficult decision. And I think in the aftermath of this, President Obama has stated publicly that it was a difficult decision. It was not one, as Ambassador Cretz stated correctly, it was not taken lightly.

Amb. Cretz: [00:16:23] It also gets back to the question of the right to protect right under this particular rubric. Is the United States capable and willing to participate in all instances around the world where the right to protect is the defining motive? That was part of the reason for the discussion among the top level and the differences that if we go to Libya, then we go to other places in the world. And where does it stop and how do we define the exact American interest that would dictate the very difficult decision of sending our men and women into harm's way?

Amb. McCarthy: [00:16:55] And as the president made the decision and issued the order for Operation Odyssey Dawn, the US led a coalition. We did not do this alone. But how did we do it so quickly, and how did AFRICOM come to be in the lead?

Gen. Ham: [00:17:08] I think AFRICOM became in the lead because we were the US military headquarters charged with responsibility for the conduct of all US military operations on the African continent. But it also comes back to something I suspect Ambassador Cretz would. Second, the chiefs of defense were forearmed, so when their heads of government turned to them and said, Mr.. The minister or general or admiral, what do you think? They had already thought their way through it and that proved very helpful. It's the power of relationships that develop over time, certainly in the military case, but I think probably even more so in the diplomatic world.

Amb. Cretz: [00:17:43] Not only did we have to get all the elements in place, as the general was talking about, but we had to do it very quickly because there was not the kind of time that we would have liked to plan and everything else because our allies, and especially the French, were really determined to do this action quickly because they felt I think a lot of us agreed that Gaddafi was moving very quickly and that we either had to be prepared to not take action quickly or to be prepared to deal with a humanitarian catastrophe once he got to Benghazi.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:18:14] And we did move swiftly. So within my understanding, within 72 hours, we obliterated the Libyan air defense system and did other things.

Gen. Ham: [00:18:22] The US and the allies that participated in the initial actions in Libya were very, very effective. Part of that was, frankly, the Libyan military is not overly sophisticated. We were able to, through a concerted effort of a multinational intelligence effort, gain a clearer understanding of where their facilities were, what their capabilities were, and the marshaling of forces. As Ambassador Cretz has stated, of many, many nations, mostly NATO, but not exclusively NATO. Sweden participated, the United Arab Emirates participated, Qatar participated, certainly US led. And we had the preponderance of the military capability, particularly strike aircraft and Tomahawk missiles, which were launched from both surface ships and submarines. But the United Kingdom had the same capabilities, many other nations as well. The challenge was for our joint task force. It was actually a float on a US command ship in the Mediterranean, coordinating the actions of multiple nations so that we could achieve the intended effect and have a synchronized effort, not individual national efforts.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:19:28] Well, we moved swiftly to turn the operation over to NATO so it wouldn't be just US led, but NATO led. How did that transition take place.

Gen. Ham: [00:19:37] From a military standpoint? There were a number of challenges at the very outset, and the decisions implementing what became Operation Odyssey Dawn was made very clear to me by the secretary of defense and by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that while this initial effort would be US led and a coalition effort, there was an effort underway to rapidly transition the lead for the military phase of the operation to another entity. That entity at the outset was unnamed. I think people hoped that it would be NATO, but NATO had not made any decision. But there were other options available. Ultimately, the North Atlantic Council made a decision that NATO would undertake this mission, and so then it became the process of transitioning a US coalition led effort to a NATO led effort. There are some military challenges in that, just because of different communications systems, different command structures. The most helpful thing, though, was the US Joint Task Force, headquartered in Naples, now afloat, was led by Admiral Sam Locklear, a United States naval officer who, in addition to being the joint task force commander, also had a NATO role as allied forces South.

Gen. Ham: [00:20:51] And his deputy, Canadian Lieutenant General Charlie Bouchard, who was involved in all the planning of this. So the transition from the US led to a NATO led and General Bouchard, the Canadian, a NATO officer, became the military commander of the NATO operation, which became unified protector.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:21:12] At the same time that these military actions were taking place. We were also engaged in a diplomatic effort for negotiations to end this civil war. We appointed a special envoy, and we were also in touch with key leaders. Gene, can you tell us a little bit more about this diplomatic side?

Amb. Cretz: [00:21:29] The secretary and president decided to send Chris Stevens as a special envoy to Benghazi and who was later killed, as everybody knows, in Benghazi. And he went into Benghazi at great risk to join a few other countries that had representation there while the Libyans were still beginning the revolt. We were getting information from him on the revolt and what was happening in Benghazi. Et cetera. And at the same time, there was a tremendous amount of you know, within this contact group. Secretary Clinton was traveling all over Europe at that time, meeting with NATO defense ministers and meeting with others. We had a number of proposals from people in different situations saying that they had an end to the Gaddafi inner circle and they were sure that they could negotiate an end to this war. But I was always skeptical. I think most of the ones that certainly that we followed up never came to fruition. And it was my view from the start that no one would probably even broach the issue with Gaddafi of his stepping down, which became, in effect, the issue, the main issue for the rebels. And so once that started, we did not start with an intent for regime change. But as time went on, it looked to be the only solution that would satisfy the rebels and also bring an end to the war.

Gen. Ham: [00:22:44] The military mission it formalized in the orders that were issued to United States Africa Command, whereas Ambassador Chris said it was no mention of regime change. There was no mention of the removal of Mr. Gaddafi from the government. That was not the mission. The mission was to protect civilians. And in fact, this became a bit of a point of contention. The opposition forces in Libya, with understandable reason, thought that perhaps we were there to support them. And so part of the effort of the military team that Ambassador Cretz dispatched to us, Colonel Linvill and others, was to communicate with the leaders in the opposition to say, no, we are not here to support you. We are. This is not your Air force. This is not an element to support the opposition. We are here to protect civilians. And oh, by the way, that means all civilians. So just as Mr. Gaddafi's forces threaten the civilians in Benghazi and were the subject of military attack, should you opposition forces threaten civilians in areas that are loyal to Mr. Gaddafi? You too, could be subject to the mission was not regime change. In fact, that was made clear to me on many, many occasions.

Amb. Cretz: [00:23:59] I went on Secretary Clinton's instructions to Rome and then to Cairo toward the end of March, and I arranged to meet with representatives of the Transitional National Council and the people who were leading the revolt. We met in Cairo and I asked them questions. I asked them what they were doing. And it was my assessment at that time, which I wrote back to Washington this was a legitimate national revolt. While it had elements of Islamic extremists in it, they were not the driving force. They were a part and parcel of this. They saw an opportunity and they took it. But it was a national revolt. And it was in my mind no doubt that that's what it was.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:24:39] And it took a number of months on the ground for the rebel forces to gain enough territory. And eventually they had enough strength to attack Gaddafi's strongholds. I gather that by September, they had secured control over the entire country. They captured Gaddafi and he was killed and the NATO operation ended in October. General, what can you share about those last few months?

Gen. Ham: [00:25:03] So our efforts at Africa Command, while the NATO mission was ongoing, started to focus more on what's next. What happens when this mission is over at that point? It wasn't until August when Mr. Gaddafi was killed. So there was at least in the early stages, there was an expectation that Gaddafi would still be the head of government. And then what would the nature of our relationship be with Libya? The military relationship, and what should our role be in trying to help Libya in the aftermath of Gaddafi's death? And they helped Libya reconstruct or construct a military that was more legitimate, that was subordinate to legitimate civilian control? And in that effort, what we found is all who have worked in Libya found is that there were no institutions. It was a family run business. There were the facades of a ministry of defense and a ministry of health and education and so on. But they were just shells.

Amb. Cretz: [00:26:00] Getting back to your point of the length of time that it took to recognize the Transitional National Council. First of all, there were legal implications about recognition that we had to deal with. Secondly, it was also a question. That we wanted to make sure that should they be the ones who were able to assume power once Gaddafi fell. What was their view toward human rights? What was their view toward democracy? What was how were they going to govern? How were they going to govern? So several I had several discussions with the leadership and even asking them for documents of commitments to human rights and democracy, etcetera, which then enabled us later on toward the end to recognize them.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:26:36] What were your top priorities as you reconstituted the mission back in Libya?

Amb. Cretz: [00:26:41] I'm glad that you started that question because it gets to the heart of the matter in terms of the relationship between the military and the ambassador and the embassy on the ground. Once Tripoli fell in August, we decided to go back to reconstitute a presence. And when we went back, we went back with a team of State Department security officials, as well as a special team from Stuttgart, which was the military. The basic thing that we wanted to do was, number one, reestablish the presence. Number two, give an assessment of where we were because the war was not over yet. Number three, try to assess what the Libyan people needed to stabilize the situation and then to figure out what else needed to be done in order to resolve the situation. When we first went back, we were right in the middle of the city because we did not have an embassy anymore. And so at that particular point, the military team that had been dispatched worked hand in glove with our security people to protect us because it was still a Wild West situation. There were militias roaming around. There was gunfire. Et cetera. It was a very dangerous situation. And so once that happened, we moved out into a compound further out after about six weeks, further out from the capital, and then went back to my residence to actually establish an embassy presence with our staff and our former locals who had worked with us prior to the revolution.

Gen. Ham: [00:28:00] The small team that was dispatched from the United States Africa Command to support the embassy is a good example. I think of the very close cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense. They're often perceived to be adversaries. And while the two departments don't necessarily always have the same view on matters in this particular case, it was an opportunity for the Department of Defense to bring its capabilities in support of the Department of State. So and again, a very austere environment in which the Department of Defense, America's armed forces, are trained and equipped and prepared to operate in. So it was not only bringing security and transportation, but communications, some medical support as well. It's also interesting, I think, for people to understand that when that team dispatched, they worked exclusively under the direction of Ambassador Cretz. They certainly had linkages back to us at United States Africa Command. But for the purpose of this mission, he was their boss.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:28:57] They were part of the country, part of.

Gen. Ham: [00:28:59] The team, and it worked flawlessly. Some very courageous young people participated in that mission. It was again, it was one of these examples of when you don't care about who gets credit, you can get a lot done.

Amb. Cretz: [00:29:11] So if I may, because this is really, I think, the heart of what I certainly would like to communicate to your listeners in terms of the military and the State Department working together to further American interests. There were several examples. For example, during the initial months after Gaddafi had fell, the government that had taken over one of their main concerns was dealing with the war wounded. This was an absolute necessity to find a way to make sure that those people were taken care of because it was a domestic imperative at the time. Luckily, in the team that had been dispatched from Stuttgart, we had a flight surgeon. And so when we were identifying which of the people that we would like to try to get out for medical help, either to Germany or to the states, the surgeon actually went around to the different hospitals to make sure that the candidates were legitimate because some were not, as we found out during the time. And so that was one instance. Second instance, there was several kids who were playing in the compound where Gaddafi used to live.

Amb. Cretz: [00:30:12] And there was a 1,000 pound bomb that had not detonated. And these kids were playing around in it. And it could have been calamitous. We worked with our military people to defuse the bomb. This was a tremendous effort. It was the embassy and the military doing public relations because we had to get the word out to Libyans, don't go near that place on such and such a date and such and such a time. A third element of which I would thank the military for helping us as well. They worked hand in glove with our security people to allow my staff and I to get out and about in this very dangerous environment to be able to see contacts that we would normally have not been able to seen. So I was in touch with General Ham, who agreed to leave the team beyond its normal expiry date, a termination date to help us with our security. So this was a tremendous melding of the State Department and the Defense Department in the interest of the United States overseas and especially in this very, very difficult environment.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:31:14] Drawing from this experience, what would you say to the young ones who come behind you about the need to work together across our military and our diplomats? We each have different capabilities and capacities.

Amb. Cretz: [00:31:27] When I look back, starting from my career in 1980 one inches the State Department, I think there was this basically stovepiping system and the concept of the country team, which in effect is the meeting of the CEO with his main officers in the in the C-suite was not really solidified. I think probably after nine divided by 11 and the first war in Iraq, that that system became much more stable. And we were able to under that rubric of the country team, the ambassador was able to make sure that all elements of the country team were working together in concert for clearly defined American goals with the added aspect of allowing each of the departments, including the military and others, to carry out what they needed to do for their own particular bureaucratic interests.

Gen. Ham: [00:32:14] Following on Ambassador Cretz comments about the relationship between the United States military and the country team at United States Africa Command, we would always try to make sure that all of our folks in the command understood that no matter where I was in the African continent, you know, and I had a dedicated airplane and you had a communications team and you got security and you have all the symbolism of the most powerful military on the face of the planet. But wherever I was in Africa, I was never, ever the senior American in that country. There was always an ambassador or a chargé who was the official and senior representative of the president and of the United States government. And our job, my job as the commander of United States Africa Command was to be supportive of that chief of mission. Now, that didn't mean that we always agreed, but what we did agree on is that we would well, we might bark at each other behind closed doors. When we came out and appeared side by side to the host nation government, there could be no daylight, there could be no scene.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:33:19] That's a very important point.

Gen. Ham: [00:33:20] You know, people in the host country and the community could not see any difference between the senior military commander and the chief of mission. And I think that was very important. Secondly, in terms of the interagency coordination and particularly between the Department of State and the Department of Defense, in my experience, I found that the further away from Washington, D.C. you are, the easier the collaboration becomes. And as you get closer to Washington, D.C., people become a little more parochial and a little more interested. And that's true about budgets and all the rest of it. But further away, at the operational end of this, where policies that are made in Washington are actually implemented, people are more concerned about getting the job done. It was a hard won lesson, but I think one of the outcomes of enduring operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places has been a cohort of military leaders who have grown up in a cohort of foreign service officers, USAID mission directors and others who have grown up, where this collaboration on the ground of interagency effort is quite normal. I think that bodes well for us. The challenge is how do we keep that momentum building and keep that interagency coordination at the fore?

Amb. Cretz: [00:34:37] And at the end of the day, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out we all represent the US government. And what is the US interest in this particular issue in this particular country? Et cetera. And once we are able to just make sure that all of us are inculcated with the usual bureaucratic pettiness and parochialism should fade away.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:34:58] Well, gentlemen, I want to thank you for sharing this important historical experience, but most importantly, explaining to our audiences the vital nature of the relationship between our military and our diplomats to protect the United States and to advance its interests overseas. So thank you. Carter Thank you, Gene. It's been a fantastic conversation. I really appreciate you taking the time to be with us.

Amb. Cretz: [00:35:21] Thank you very much.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:35:30] This has been a new episode in the series. The General and the Ambassador, A Conversation. Thank you for listening. The series is a production of the American Academy of Diplomacy with the generous support of the Una Chapman Cox Foundation. You can find the podcast on all major sites and on our website. GeneralAmbassadorPodcast. Org. We welcome input and suggestions on the series. Please let us know your thoughts via General.Ambassador.podcast@gmail.com.