Episode 71. The US, Poland and the Eastern Front

Episode Transcript:

Amb. McCarthy: [00:00:14] Welcome to a conversation in the Academy of Diplomacy series, The General and the Ambassador. Our podcast brings together senior U.S. diplomats and senior U.S. military leaders in conversations about their partnership during a major international crisis or challenge affecting U.S. national security. I'm Ambassador Deborah McCarthy, the producer and host. Our focus today will be on the U.S. security relationship with Poland. Our guests today are General Ben Hodges and Ambassador Paul Jones. The General and the ambassador is a production of the American Academy of Diplomacy. This podcast has been sponsored by Dataminr, a leading artificial intelligence platform that delivers real time breaking news alerts to help you make critical decisions and respond with speed and confidence. General Hodges served as the commander of U.S. Army Europe from 2014 to 2018. In his career, he commanded infantry units at the company battalion and brigade levels. He also served as director of Operations Regional Command South in Afghanistan, director of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell at the Joint Staff and Commander of Allied Land Command. Currently. He is a senior adviser at Human Rights First. Ambassador Paul Jones was the U.S. ambassador to Poland from 2015 to 2018. Subsequently, he served as a charge in Pakistan. His other senior positions include. U.s. Ambassador to Malaysia. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. Deputy Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan. And Deputy Chief of Mission in the Philippines, Macedonia. And at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Currently, he leads International Government Relations for Raytheon Technologies. General Hodges. Ambassador Jones, welcome to the General Ambassador, and it is great to see you both again.

Gen. Hodges: [00:02:25] Very happy to be here.

Amb. Jones: [00:02:27] Thank you so much, Deborah. Thanks for the invitation. Thanks for doing this series and letting us relive some of our experiences together.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:02:34] When I approached you, Paul, about joining the series, you immediately chose Ben as your general, your partner, and clearly you hit it off when you worked together. So I thought we'd start talking a little bit about this partnership and how it began.

Amb. Jones: [00:02:49] Well, sure, I'll go first. You know, I was real comfortable and real familiar with working closely with our militaries since my first plunge in Bosnia, which was a tricky one, and then Macedonia, Phillipines, Afghanistan, Naval War College. So it was real natural for me to look for a collaborator, but I couldn't have been more fortunate to have been as a collaborator, not just for me, but for many ambassadors. And, you know, I'd say not only has been a great leader, a great soldier, a great human being, but he had this ability to focus on what's most important, even if it wasn't the sexiest issue around, explain it brilliantly and and bring along politicians, think tanks, the public. And we did an awful lot together. And and it's just a pleasure to be back together again for this conversation.

Gen. Hodges: [00:03:37] Ambassador Paul, thank you. I think he wanted me here because he knew he had about 50 more points on the IQ scale and he would be able to dominate this conversation. I think the first time we met was actually when you were working for the Assistant Secretary, Tori Nuland, and I was just impressed with your style, frankly, very, very selfless kind of public servant and but also the way you. Explain things in a way that it was never condescending. It was matter of fact. Maybe that is why we hit it off. And you have a dry sense of humor, which I always especially appreciate. Ever since I was a young officer, I've always known that our job was to support the ambassador, the president, senior representative in any country. And there was never a question of doing my own thing in any country. We grew up knowing that you say yes to anything the ambassador wants and you immediately stop anything the ambassador doesn't like. If I'm not able to persuade and I think we were fortunate to be in Poland at such a strategically important time as well.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:04:57] The United States has had a long security relationship with Poland. It supported the country's NATO membership in 1999 and a succession to the EU in 2004. Poland has also been central to U.S. and NATO's efforts to deter Russian aggression in Europe. The country is large, has a large standing army and sits in a critical geographic location. Poland is bordered by Ukraine, Belarus, the Russian Federation, as well as Germany, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania. Because of Russia's 2014 occupation of Ukrainian Crimea and its subsequent war on Ukraine beginning early 2022, the United States, as well as NATO's, have increased their presence in Poland. On the U.S. side, in addition to multiple U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force detachments, the U.S. leads, NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group deploys the Rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team, and is building an Aegis Ashore facility as a contribution to NATO's ballistic missile defense. All in all, today there are an estimated 10,000 U.S. troops on Polish soil. Soon, however, this could expand. Ben, let me start with you. The list I just gave is long and many listeners are not military experts. What's the significance of this buildup?

Gen. Hodges: [00:06:21] Well, I think there are three things that make it very significant. First of all, just from looking at the map, the geography, Poland's location, it is the center of gravity for NATO and for the United States on NATO's eastern front. I mean, from the top of the Baltic, all the way down to the Black Sea. Poland sits literally in the middle of all that. So from a ability to project power, to conduct operations or exercises that would help with deterrence or defense, it is that sort of a hub. And I think that's why it's not an accident that the United States has put so much capability there of land forces, air forces, logistics, the recent establishment of the first permanent installation in Eastern Europe. What is now, and I love it, is called Camp Kosciuszko and Poznan. That's so geography is is part one, part two or reason number two. Of course, Poland, what an incredible ally. I mean, the relationship that goes back to our own revolution. And I think the United States has always recognized that Poland has such an emotional but with reason to be emotional because of their history. And, you know, when your country disappears off the map three or four times, you have reason to be greatly concerned. And so I think the United States has recognized that. And you never had to push the poles to do more if sometimes it was the opposite. This is one thing that Paul coached me on when we were first talking, I think my first visit to Poland when he was ambassador, and he said, Look, Poland wants to be seen as a first tier ally.

Gen. Hodges: [00:08:16] And I had not heard that sort of formulation before, but I grew to understand what he meant, that Poland is not a security consumer, they're security provider. They contribute to the alliance with real capabilities and access. And the third thing then is, and I've alluded to it already, I was completely wrong. I was against permanent basing. The Poles, of course, wanted it. I was against it because I thought that, frankly, in the last administration they were not willing to to do the diplomatic work with all the members of NATO, to bring along our other allies to agree that having a rejection of the NATO-Russia founding act, which of course the Russians had already abrogated, but nonetheless NATO's was still complying for us to have a permanent base somewhere. I thought if we weren't. To do the diplomatic work with all the other countries, then it would damage cohesion of the alliance. I was wrong. Our well-intentioned efforts were not rewarded by good behaviour by the Kremlin. And so now we've gotten it right. And I think it's successful now because of the work that's been done by our diplomats to lay to set the conditions for the SOFA, the Status of Forces Agreement, to be able to move, to have stuff. It's not easy, and that's why we're there now.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:09:44] Well, Paul, can you explain a bit how on the diplomatic side you negotiate these sofas to have more troops and how you resisted these Polish calls for a permanent military base?

Amb. Jones: [00:09:55] First of all, there's obviously a lot of enthusiasm in Poland for the US military deployments, rotational, permanent, everything. We had to sort of explain what that meant and to, you know, convince the Poles by what we were doing that that was serious, even if it wasn't a permanent military base. And and Ben and I and our teams did a lot of showing and telling. And we we got a lot of great opportunities from the Polish government with ceremonies every time we were, you know, establishing a new command or having an exercise. And the Prime Minister would be there. The Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, and and the Poles, I say incredibly enthusiastic. The other thing that we were doing that Ben started before my time together with my predecessor, Ambassador Steve Mull, is these visits to towns across Poland, you know, Ben's units would come through together with Polish units and have a static display. I would go have a speech with the mayor. You know, there'd be thousands, tens of thousands of people would come to these things. We always ran out of the American flags in the first few minutes. Such enthusiasm for photos with the US, the Polish soldiers. One time I was standing and I just caught out of the corner of my eye. I turned and here's a Polish elderly woman passing out gingerbread. This was in Torun. It's a town known for gingerbread. She's passing out gingerbread to three US soldiers who are just sort of looking and taking the gingerbread. And she is telling them with 100% sincerity. She said, Eat this because if you eat this you'll always come back. And that's what Poland needs. And it was just tear jerking, you know, to listen to that.

Amb. Jones: [00:11:27] One other vignette where I think it was when we were inaugurating the Armored Brigade Combat Team, one or the other, you know, US deployments. But I was walking through the crowd after all the speeches with the new commander, and we were walking along and this elderly gentleman came up and just hugged us. And he said, I was here when this was a Soviet military base and I dreamed of the Russians leaving. Eventually they did, he said. I never dared dream the Americans would come, but you're here. And he said, Thank you. What we also did with the Poles was to tell them how to attract a permanent military base, like what they got to do to improve their ranges, improve their infrastructure. There was a big discussion that Ben and I and our teams had on where the US deployments would be, that Poles wanted them more in the East. You know, the facilities were better in the west and and we said to the Poles, you know, we'll develop your infrastructure in the east. That's how you attract, develop the ranges so we can do better exercises here. So, you know, and then just on the point about the NATO-Russia Founding Act, 100% agree with Ben. I was always in favor of a permanent base to hold the Poles. You know, I'm sympathetic with you, but that is not the policy of NATO's, not the policy of the United States. And so you've got to do the things to get there. But it was really the Germans and other allies. Who I think, you know, held that up because they history has moved on and now we see the value of it.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:12:50] As a senior diplomat and the president's representative, you also had to manage a number of transitions, and you arrived in Poland just before the inauguration of a new government. Earlier, a conservative right wing Law and Justice Party had won the election. The party was known as being nationalist and skeptical of the EU. It took a number of steps to exercise control over the judiciary, brands and the media, and many saw this as a backsliding in terms of the country's commitment to liberal democracy. Can you share with us what this election meant for U.S. interests and how you work to keep the relationship on an even keel under the Obama administration?

Amb. Jones: [00:13:34] First, it's exhilarating to be the U.S. ambassador to Poland. I mean, as Ben describes, a big, important relationship. And the people to people ties are huge. As my mother said, she discovered that like half her friends had Polish roots and my wife's grandmother was Polish. So we had some somewhat distant but some family members there. But it's not an easy job. It's not easy at any time because a lot of complicated issues, a lot of history. This was the first major populist election in the Western world with the Law and Justice Party coming to power. And and it was a surprise, frankly, to the Obama administration and to, you know, the people who were at the embassy before I got there. So we had to pivot really quickly and establish credibility, access, trust with the new administration, very conservative, very rural based, not really looking at Europe the same way that the Obama administration was. And then in the very early on, they took some steps that they had promised to that that began to curtail the independence of the judiciary and change things around on freedom of media. I felt like a marriage counselor a lot of times between including between the EU and Poland, between Washington and Warsaw. We had the access to the leader of the party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and other Polish officials that no other country did and no other ambassador did. The critical goal on the security front that Ben and I talked about, that we all agreed was we had to keep the security and defense track moving forward and bipartisan supported in both countries by everyone, by both parties. This was just a year and a half after the Russian's first invasion of Ukraine. So it was a tricky time. There was pressure across the whole eastern flank, as you knew well from Lithuania. And and, you know, I think I think we did manage to keep that security consensus on track in both countries through this challenge in political time.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:15:22] And, Ben, this new government also purged the senior ranks of the military and other security services. Did this have any effect in terms of UCON's relationships and your own mission?

Gen. Hodges: [00:15:34] Well, not quite the level of challenge that the ambassador has to deal with. But of course, you're working with allies and you work hard to establish personal relationships. This is about trust. And because we're talking about defending each other, fighting together. At the end of the day, though, if the host nation ally does things, makes decisions that maybe I personally didn't like, but that's not my choice. Who gets to be the commander of X Division in the Polish Army? And I never wanted any Polish official or military official to think for a second that somehow I was unhappy or or trying to influence their internal business. But it was a it was for a period of time. It was a little bit of a cloud because there were some good guys that were let go and you would hear some grousing about it. I mean, frankly, I have two or three very good friends that were let go, were such good soldiers and we've become friends. But at the end of the day, these are, you know, in democratic societies, the military responds to the civilian leadership. And I had a duty to model that behavior as well. And if this is who the civilian leadership picks to be the new commander of ops or whatever, then that's who it's going to be. And you have to model, talk the talk. You have to actually do your behavior, demonstrate. Civilian authority over the military and not get caught up in the internal things. But fortunately, Poland has so many good, talented officers, they have quality officers that step forward.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:17:19] Well, you both also were in Poland when NATO held its summit there in 2016. I understand that just before the summit there was a major, major NATO exercise involving 30,000 troops and that was obviously sending signals in the run up to the summit. So can you give us a flavor of how the diplomatic side of the house and the military side of the house worked together on these summits?

Amb. Jones: [00:17:42] There was a little bit of lack of trust, frankly, from Washington in the Polish political leadership, how they would handle the summit, how they would handle the lead up to the summit. Would they sort of hijack the messages that the United States wanted to send? And and one great example of this was this exercise you referred to Exercise Anaconda, which, you know, 13,000 US soldiers, I think something like that, and 30,000 allied overall. The White House sort of started focus on this and the a couple of months into into 2016 and they said it'll be portrayed as a very anti-Russian thing. We're preparing for an invasion of Russia. That'll be the message at the summit. So, you know, naturally what I did was I called Ben and asked him what he thought and he'll tell you why it was so darn important to do this exercise. So I pushed back in Washington and said, you know, we really got to do this and we can handle it. So the instruction I got back was, okay, you, ambassador, and your team, you make sure the polls don't overplay this publicly, that the messages are this is a normal exercise. This is not something new. This is not something connected to the summit. So our teams deployed, you know, with all the public affairs folks and worked on the messaging. And I went in to see President Duda and I explained the situation to who's still the president of Poland. I explained the situation to President Duda, and I always remember his response. It was perfect. He said, "My dear ambassador, we don't have to kick the bear to find out if he has teeth." And by that he meant, you know, we care about the exercise. We're not we don't have to talk about it. And the polls were perfect on that. They didn't overplay it. The exercise was a great success. And Ben can describe and and but it was an example of what you got to work through when there is a certain change in politics and there's a certain mistrust.

Gen. Hodges: [00:19:29] I'm glad you raised the topic of the exercise, Deb, and what Paul is, in his typical humility. He protected me because there was a lot of heat coming from D.C. and also from Mons and Brussels. They did not want this exercise to happen. And in fact, our great ambassador shielded me, I think, from the White House. Of course, there was concern, but it was a Polish exercise. I had wanted it to be a NATO exercise. That was the original idea was that it would have the NATO imprimatur on it. I mean, the Russians always assume everything's NATO anyway. So I said, Well, let's let NATO get credit for it. And they would not do it. It was a multinational exercise hosted by the Poles that they do every other year anyway. It's just that this one we made it. The much, much larger. And fortunately, the Pentagon, the Army supported this and we had paratroopers from the United States and from UK, took off from their respective countries, flew across the ocean into Europe and jumped into the exercise in Poland, which is something that we would have to do in a in a real contingency. So we were practicing real stuff that's very hard, but which demonstrates a commitment to our allies that we're willing to go to the expense in trouble to do this, but also obviously to convey to the Russians that, yes, we can do this in any time we need to. So that was part of the deterrence. And this exercise took place in multiple locations around Poland. I mean, the best river crossing I have ever seen in my life there on the Vistula, using a German and British engineering unit that put this bridge across in 30 minutes from when the first part of the bridge touches the water to when the first tank was crossing.

 Gen. Hodges: [00:21:26] I've never seen anything like it in my life. And of course, President Duda showed up at that thing the next day, and then he walked out on the bridge and shook hands with all the British soldiers and the German soldiers. It was incredible experience. So real capability with Poland as the host and exactly as Paul has described it, it was done. It was professional. Of course, we didn't do it in secret. We wanted people to know that these were capabilities and the Poles had cleverly shifted the date of the exercise so that it would be more proximate to the actual summit. But the Poles demonstrated why they are a first tier ally, to use Poles phrase, because they were mature, disciplined. It was a terrific exercise and that added some real substance to the context of the NATO summit. And I have thought now, after being a NATO's soldier for 38 years, this was the best summit that the alliance has had, the one that was conducted in Warsaw because of. It showed that our alliance was reacting. You know, NATO always gets accused of being too slow and not relevant, etc.. And so here we were making significant changes with the decision to create the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups. The Obama administration says we're going to bring all the equipment for an armored division back to Europe and other things were happening. So real substance outcomes that have changed our security posture in Europe, all because of a very successful summit in Warsaw.

Amb. Jones: [00:23:15] And I just got to pile on that because I was looking back at my diaries at the time and I wrote, I'm amazed at how the US and the US Army is stepping up to the challenge here in Poland. It's going far better than I expected. We're really getting ahead of the curve on on securing the Eastern Alliance. And so, you know, when you get back to the questions earlier about permanent bases, I think when we explained all that, people understood it, they said, well, this is pretty darn good. It's maybe not a permanent base, but it's kind of remarkable what what the United States and NATO did in the eastern flank, and particularly Poland, as the hub and headquarters.

Gen. Hodges: [00:23:49] And as a tribute to the Poles, a very, very, very senior US official told me afterwards, and I'll never say his or her name said we should have made this a NATO exercise. God dang it, the Poles ran it so well, we should have taken credit for it. But you know, I've always thought that the best organizations are learning organizations, that the leader is not so insecure or so unsure that they can't acknowledge, okay, we need to improve this or we can get better. And that if it's built into the culture, whether it's an embassy or military organization or business, the ability to learn and adapt. And I think NATO's done that and the US and Europe has done that.

 Amb. McCarthy: [00:24:35] Well, you also had to manage another big transition, which is the transition from the Obama to the Trump administration. Trump administration came in challenging the post-World War to establish institutional relationships with Europe, questioned the burden of NATO on the U.S.. And harshly criticized some NATO countries for not spending enough on defense. But it looks like the Polish government didn't fall under this criticism, possibly because they do spend more than 2% of their GDP on defense. President Trump chose Warsaw as the venue for his first major speech in Europe, and he singled out Poland as a valuable ally in an address to the United Nations later in 2018. So let me start with you, Paul. Can you walk us through how you and your team managed to preserve the security relationship during this major change?

Amb. Jones: [00:25:27] First was, as always, is to be totally convincing that me as the ambassador and our entire mission is 100% behind the newly elected U.S. president. And, you know, and there was a little skepticism about that. So we did a lot to convey that this is the policy. In our view, the security relationship won't change. You know, so we did a lot of events. We did, you know, had a lot of Polish officials over. Senior officials over for the president's inauguration speech for a lot of things. So engaging people with the Trump administration. You know, the Brussels summit, not the finest hour, frankly. And it made people a little nervous. And and what I argued as well as others is that, hey, the president has a real opportunity to come to Poland and make this and make a major speech. Poles will deliver we will deliver a great crowd, a great reception. And he has the opportunity to make a statement about what the US stands for in European security and Polish security. So that happened. Fortunately, it was a great success. Credit entirely, the Great Deputy Chief of Mission, John Lord, our mission who selected a venue that had never been used before the the site of the the the statue of the striking statue in Poland, in Warsaw of the Warsaw Uprising, Great Square, 15,000 people came.

Amb. Jones: [00:26:47] We, you know, and and and the president delivered a fantastic speech that Poles across the political spectrum responded to about acknowledging their experience in, you know, against the Soviets and the Nazis and also recommended, as did others. And it came to pass that we had a three CS summit during President Trump's visit, which meant the leaders of all the eastern flank came together in Warsaw. And basically the idea was and it came across beautifully, is they all told President Trump what it's like to live in Putin's neighborhood. You know what the pressure on them is like. And that, I think, was a real great impression for the new administration, a real great feeling that all of those leaders, not just the Polish ones, got to explain that to President Trump. And I think that that helped. Right. The the security relationship in at least with the eastern flank.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:27:39] Well, Ben, can you tell us a little bit about your own engagement with senior Polish military leaders? Were they concerned about the U.S. commitment to NATO?

Gen. Hodges: [00:27:51] So I have to tell you. Two things based on what Paul just said. First, I do remember that the president's speech there at the Uprising Memorial was incredible. I mean, that was probably the most statesman like I ever saw, the former president. And the crowd there was. It was amazing. I mean, they. It was well done. I mean, the venue, the message. And of course, we always have our soldiers there. And American soldiers love to see the president no matter who it is. It's because it tells them that what they're doing really matters. I've seen soldiers responding to visits by President Clinton, President Bush, President Trump and President Obama, and just, you know, they're proud. So that was a big deal. But I will also say I was horrified by things outside of that that the administration was saying about NATO, the very harsh language towards Germany in particular, but not only Germany. And every president since Truman has complained about our European allies not doing enough. So that's that's not news. But to publicly say I'm not so sure that we would respond if Montenegro was attacked. I mean, never in my life did I imagine an American president would question our commitment. And it also the things that I heard themselves, but from others in the administration, did not understand why we were in Europe or what US military was doing in Europe.

Gen. Hodges: [00:29:37] We were not there guarding Germans. We have Germans guarding our bases. You know, it's it's just just didn't understand why we were there and why it was so important, even if not one European country paid a single euro or zloty for their own defense. The access that we have, our ability to conduct or look after our strategic interests in Africa, Europe, the Middle East is because of what we're able to do in Europe. But what was interesting is that despite what the former president was saying, the actual number of US troops in Europe was increasing to include even in Germany. And so I remember standing at a German academy giving a presentation to some lieutenant colonels, not senior officers, but not junior officers. And and I was asked a question. I said, look. Don't listen to what my president says or tweet. I said tweets. Look at what he does and what what. When the US is serious about stuff, we put a lot of money on it and we put a lot of people on it. And that's what's happening in Europe. And this German officer said, Yes, sir, but your president is the president of the United States. And what he tweets, what he says does matter. Really? That left a mark on me and he's right.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:30:58] Well, we're going to turn in just a second to discussing Ukraine. But before that, when to take advantage of your knowledge of the region to help us understand one of. Poland's neighbors, which is Kaliningrad. Generally, little is known about Kaliningrad, which is an area sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania and which after World War Two was given to the then-Soviet Union. Can you explain to our listeners, Ben, what Kaliningrad represents to Russia militarily and the threat it poses to Poland and the northern European region?

Gen. Hodges: [00:31:38] Well, of course, Kaliningrad, the Kaliningrad Oblast, which was Konigsberg in Prussia up until 1945. And then at the end of the war, the Soviet Union took it. So now it is sovereign territory of Russia. So it's not an annex thing. It's a piece of sovereign territory that's that's significant because that affects what we could do there. I mean, if we were to get involved in a conflict where leadership would be anxious to avoid escalation to a nuclear conflict, there would be a great reluctance to let ground troops go into Kaliningrad, for example. That's a factor. Kaliningrad matters to us also because of what the Russians have put there. It's a platform for their air force, for their navy, for potentially nuclear armed weapons. They have Iskander there that can carry a nuclear warhead. But I don't know at this point if they actually have the nuclear warheads inside Kaliningrad. I suspect they do, but I don't know that. And of course, the distance, what really matters and you know this so well because of your experience there in Lithuania, the distance between Kaliningrad and Belarus is it's a narrow what we call the Sauchie corridor, which is this about 60 miles wide with only really one major highway, one railroad and one secondary sort of road. If that were cut off between Russian and Belarusian troops, then you've got Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are literally physically isolated from the rest of Europe and from the rest of NATO's. That would be a problem. And because it's so narrow, the Russians could sever that connection without even having to be there through the use of indirect fires so that you couldn't transit.

 Gen. Hodges: [00:33:30] And so the threat of that has been a real concern. And then you've also got right there in that southwest corner of. Belarus is the Ostrogoths nuclear power plant, which people in in Vilnius wake up every morning thinking, Oh hell, you know, there's an accident at a nuclear power plant built by the same people that built Chernobyl. You know, we're going to have a real problem. And so this is a very vulnerable area. And thankfully, during the time that both Paul and I were working together, we were able to encourage. And this was also still during your time, Lithuanian and Polish forces. To take a look at who's responsible for defending the corridor. And in a strange sort of revelation, neither of them were. So you had US and German troops on either side of it. But this critical piece of territory didn't have a dedicated defense. So in probably the best. As I talked to experts on Polish and Lithuanian relationships, it probably was the best ever in terms of at least the military working together to come up with ways to defend and protect, keep open that sidewalk corridor with German and American troops involved as well. The last thing I'd say, Kaliningrad is also a huge liability for Russia. They've got a piece of their sovereign territory now completely surrounded by NATO countries. Looming addition of Sweden and Finland makes it even more of a liability for them.

 Amb. Jones: [00:35:12] Well, I'll just offer two little vignettes on Kaliningrad. One was this concern about particularly Iskander missiles that were deployed temporarily and then permanently in Kaliningrad, came up during the brief with President Trump when he visited. And it came up because he was reading the public statement prepared and and he got to the phrase Russian aggression. And he said, Mr. Ambassador, do you think I need to say the words Russian aggression? Is that an appropriate thing to say? This was part of many other interchanges during that time. He was very casual and interactive with all of us who are there. I mean, his team and I was there from the embassy, you know, and I said, Mr. President, it would go over really well because the Poles are seeing some real pressure, including these new missile capability in Kaliningrad, the big Russian exercises simulating attack on on Poland and and probing from fighter aircraft. And and the president said, well, you know, they can always get hit from Kaliningrad, whatever whatever is there and CIA briefer and I now they can be hit within like four or 5 minutes from any know anywhere in Poland can be hit with this missile capability the Russians are putting in. 

Amb. Jones: [00:36:18] Their other vignette on Kaliningrad was the lead for the NATO enhanced for the enhanced presence in Poland with 1000 or so US soldiers. They were deployed 40 miles from Kaliningrad. I mean, you know what a tripwire. You know, when I was hearing from my team and I went up and visited the commander and talked to him, and I was just stunned and outraged to learn that they didn't know what the Polish military plan was. Should the Russians do something in that area? And and so I called Ben, said, Ben, this sounds like a problem. What do you think? And he said, it sure is a problem, you know, and we we need to have our commanders understand and be collaborating with the Polish forces in the area where they're where they're deployed. So Ben Ben came over. We spoke with political leadership about this and eventually the problem was solved. But another example of the real importance of that tight relationship between the general and the ambassador.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:37:12] Well, I wanted to turn now to the issue of Ukraine. Obviously, Russia's actions in Ukraine have played a very large role in the U.S. Polish security relationship. When Russia went into Crimea in 2014, the then government of President Komorowski played a leading role in calling for reinforcing NATO along the eastern frontier and imposing sanctions on Russia. The subsequent law and justice government also came to Ukraine's defense after Russia invaded this past February, becoming the second largest contributor of weapons to Ukraine and a major donor of humanitarian aid. It also opened its border and has taken in over 3 million Ukrainians. So Paul, let me start with you. Can you describe to our listeners what the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 meant for Poles and Poland, given their history with the Soviet Union? 

Amb. Jones: [00:38:06] We Americans, we often sort of dismiss history, you know, say, hey, that was we look forward. But as Ben was talking about earlier, it's kind of a good indicator of how people approach issues. And I think what the Poles have seen in what the Russians have been doing in Ukraine from 2014 to this year is in light of their own experience with Russia and and Prussia salami slicing Polish territory at that time in the 18th century, to the point where Poland was extinguished from the map for 123 years. So this is very much up front in Polish minds that this is what could happen to Ukraine, with the idea being that now, now Russia would be on the border with Poland instead of Ukraine, you know, the Poles right after that. They then defeated the Red Army in Poland, which was trying to bring communism to Germany, crossing Poland. And in this incredible battle, the miracle on the Vistula, as it's called, which isn't very well known, the Poles defeated, the Russians protected Germany and Europe from from Bolshevism. And that's the role that Poland plays, sees it's playing and doesn't always get a lot of credit for. 

Amb. Jones: [00:39:18] One other vignette on the on Ukraine in 2018, our ambassador in Ukraine, Masha Yovanovitch, a good friend and colleague of both of ours, we went to the very NATO training center there outside of Lviv and in Ukraine, which in March was hit by Russian missiles. In order to see a change of command and see the Poles, the Brits, the U.S. training with Ukrainian soldiers who were coming right off the front in the east. You know, this war was going on a little below the radar, but people were getting killed on a regular basis. And there was fighting back and forth between the Ukrainians and Russian troops and Russian proxies. Always remember what the U.S. special forces there who are working with the Ukrainians told me in a little poolside. They said we learn a lot more from the Ukrainians than than they learn from us because they're fighting the Russians. They know how they're fighting and they're using some capabilities that we have provided better than we ever expected. They could be used. It's a big deal, obviously, Ukraine for Poland, I mean, for all of us. But when you're right next door, it's it's historic.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:40:25] The Ukraine crisis also reinforced Poland's determination to wean itself from Russian gas supplies. I know during your time, the U.S. set up a new energy dialogue with Poland. And can you tell us what the Poles did during your time to wean themselves off of this Russian dependence?

Amb. Jones: [00:40:49] I would stretch back a little bit even further to when this Law and Justice Party, this conservative rural party with which we had some political issues on democracy issues back when they were in power in the early 2000, they had this as a major part of the agenda that they needed to become more independent from Russian gas because they saw that as a vulnerability. So they started then building an LNG terminal up in the northwest corner of Poland called Sina, which where it was finished during just as I was arriving. And then they also started working on this idea of a Baltic pipe, a pipeline of natural gas from the Norwegian fields through Denmark and also into Poland. Both of those were completed during my time with considerable diplomatic support, and I give almost Hochstein a great deal of credit for helping with that diplomatically with the Norwegians and the Danes especially. And we brought you know, I remember we brought a Commerce Department delegation of LNG exporters up to that LNG terminal in Srinagar, and they looked around and they said, Wow. The Poles have invested a lot more than necessary, right? This is overcapacity. We're delighted to export. But I would say the Poles were forward looking and the energy dialogue was part of that was including on the nuclear front. And we did a lot in the United States to encourage it. But the Poles, you know, they are serious and this government in particular. But, you know, any pole would be serious about getting independent from Russian gas.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:42:21] Well, Ben, I wanted to turn to you. There was a lot of coverage of Poland's offer to supply Russian MiG fighter jets to Ukraine this past March. The offer was apparently tied to requests for the U.S. to backfill the planes as well as to deliver the MiGs to Ukraine. Can you walk us through what the offer meant in terms of Ukraine's capabilities and what kind of equipment in general has Poland been able to give Ukraine? And has this made a difference? I know you've talked a lot about this.

Gen. Hodges: [00:42:52] First of all, it was a mistake, I think, by the administration not to make this work. And I think the polls were probably a little bit clumsy in how this all came out. And, you know, all of our capitals leak information when people are trying to influence things, but nonetheless, it was it was not well handled on either side. But when you get to the substance of it, I think it would have been a terrific idea to enable Poland to provide these aircraft for Ukraine and then for the US to backfill either with other aircraft or to reposition our own Air Force there until. Capabilities could be replaced for Poland. But this goes to, I think, two or three mistakes that we're making and what otherwise the administration has done a terrific job in supporting Ukraine. It goes to number one. But we continue to overestimate or overstate the likelihood of Russian escalation of some sort. The Russians, they're exhausted right now. I mean, think about it. After five months with 90% of their military involved or at least their army involved in Ukraine, and they are completely stalemated. They've not been able to get more than a quarter of of Ukraine. And that's the best they can do right now. And their Navy and the Black Sea is terrified of Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. The Russian air force hardly dares to fly into Ukrainian airspace, and instead they launch missiles from Russia or Belarus or from over the Caspian Sea.

Gen. Hodges: [00:44:36] So I think we've overestimated Russia. And therefore the White House continues to. We spoon out things to the Ukrainians versus saying we want Ukraine to win, we want to crush the Russians, make sure they don't they don't threaten their neighbors anymore and other countries will follow the US. But if we have step or spoon out hammers or MLRS or other systems or we withhold certain capabilities that we know that Ukrainians need, then the other nations will do the same thing. And Paul mentioned this earlier, and I want to put stop it. Ukrainians are the fast learners of any nation I've ever encountered. We saw them. They learned how to use counterfeit radar that we gave them early on. I remember getting threatened by then Assistant Secretary Nuland. She said, Don't you let them get any of these things destroyed. When the US first gave the Q 36 to Ukraine. They were exceptional at how quickly they learned, in fact, their radars better than I ever realized it, because of how the Ukrainians employed it. And I've never been under Russian artillery fire. You know, they have. And so they would have had no problem learning. They already knew how to fly these MiGs. They've demonstrated how quickly they can employ other systems that the nations are providing.

Gen. Hodges: [00:46:05] So the idea that, well, it will take too long for them to learn that those were poor excuses. But the real issue is what is our strategy? And by the way, as a retired guy, I have zero authority and I have zero responsibility. So I can offer all kinds of helpful advice. The president, of course, and that security adviser, Jake Sullivan, they have tons of pressure on their shoulders. I get that. But I think that we haven't said what Secretary Clinton said one time and then he never said it again. We're going to have Ukraine win and we're going to weaken Russia so bad that they cannot threaten their neighbors, our allies anymore. And I think that's caused us to make some bad policy decisions because think about it, when this started five months ago, there was a big debate about whether or not to give Stinger because, oh, my gosh, if a Russian helicopter gets shot down with an American made Stinger, they may escalate. That seems so silly now. Here we are five months later and you've got memes all over the place about HIMARS O'Clock. And, you know, as Russian ammunition storage sites go up in smoke, we need to make a commitment to Ukraine winning. Not this very difficult to understand. We want Russia to have suffered a strategic loss or defeat. I don't know how you define that.

 Amb. McCarthy: [00:47:28] What was the wrap up? I wanted to ask what in your view, are the long term implications of Russia's war on Ukraine, on the US Polish security relationship? Can we fulfill Poland's expectations going forward?

Amb. Jones: [00:47:43] I appreciate Ben recalling my personal goal of of to make Poland a top tier NATO's ally, meaning an ally that that has the capability and the confidence of the rest of the alliance, especially, first and foremost, for the United States to be among, you know, like the UK, Germany and France, that we consult on everything quietly. We I think we made good progress. But I remember talking to a Polish very senior political official who said that'll take like five or ten years because we've got to invest in our military. It's going to take time for the Europeans to adjust to Poland being such a serious player, given our location and our history and telling him, I don't think we have that long and I don't. And I think events now show we don't have that long. Poland and the US Polish relationship is to be established at that level. It is. It has grown a lot. I think we made great progress in Poland is doing its part. I mean, they've passed a law saying they're going to be spending 3%. I think about politically said they want to go to five. But I think a lot has to be done on the US side and on the Polish side to really cement the capability and confidence in this security relationship that Russia has in most recent invasion of Ukraine just underscores the urgency of that.

 Gen. Hodges: [00:49:02] Because of the work that our diplomats have done, that the conditions are set to have this longer term. Presence by US military. There's still a lot to do, but the agents ashore, which is I think we'll finally be operational here within the next few months. We've already talked about the fifth Corps headquarters in Poznan, Camp Kosciuszko, first permanent base in the former Warsaw Pact or Soviet state. And and that's that's a big deal, a headquarters, because all the other stuff can come and go. But if you've got a headquarters there, then they they know the laws. They know the relationships. They can can facilitate people coming in and out, whereas before it was everybody was transient, rotational, which I'm sure was a nightmare for the embassy, as American soldiers would come from Texas and Colorado trying to understand how to pronounce names of towns and people and who was who was in charge of what. But also not too far down the road from there is a place called province, which is a Polish air base. And we decided what support from the embassy to turn perverts into our logistical. Hub for Poland and for Northern Europe, because we had such success with a similar situation down in Romania at a place called MK, which was a Romanian air base. So we use that model and now we've got hundreds of American soldiers. 

Gen. Hodges: [00:50:33] Rotational aviation and logistics there in culverts. But more importantly, NATO paid for the establishment of what we call apps ami pre-positioned stocks. So the equipment for an armored brigade is inside culverts in a facility that was paid for by NATO's funding. That was that is a critical step forward of of solidifying this kind of relationship and presence, which I think our Polish allies and others respect and appreciate, and that the Russians will recognize because. If you don't have the logistics in place, then nobody's going to take you serious. So. So that kind of investment is important. I know we're almost out of time, but if you'll let me have just two quick little things that I want to add. First of all, I know so many officers that served in the US embassy in Warsaw as well as in Vilnius, and every one of them always had positive things to say about the ambassador, because I would always make a point of asking the army attache or the shadow defense attache. I said, So how is it there at the embassy? And they always felt like they were part of the team that what they had to say was valued and they understood their role working within every team. So I want to thank both of you as well as any other professional diplomats that will be listening to this, that your soldiers and your airmen and your Marines and sailors like being a part of your team and and you two in particular. 

Gen. Hodges: [00:52:15] Last comment on Paul Jones. It was during the Anaconda Exercise and he was hosting the Independence Day reception at his residence, as ambassadors always do. And of course, I did not have a dress proper dress uniform with me. I was in my camouflage uniform because we were out on exercise. And he said, Come on, don't worry about that. We want you, you and your guys to come to the embassy, to the residence for the reception anyway. And there were hundreds of people glittering and in all their finery. And then you had four guys that you could smell coming down the road. We showed up and you made us feel very welcome. And I appreciated that. And and I got to see the daughter of an old family friend. You may remember Sara Higgins Becker. She was there. It was her first year as a Foreign Service officer, and she was sent to the embassy there to help do some of the work, I think, preparing for the upcoming summit. And she was having the time of her life being on your team. 

Amb. Jones: [00:53:16] It's always a great thing for me personally, but also for all our poles to see, you know, real soldiers, every level coming, you know, right back from from an exercise. And my personal great regret, as you know well, Ben was I had to miss that day where we got to watch the where President Duda walked on the pontoon bridge that was is extraordinary you know, and you described what it would look like and it sure enough did and the videos did. But, you know, Washington said stay back in Warsaw because we need a little bit more on the on some of those tricky democracy issues. We were working with the Polish Senate and and trying to get some more progress before President Obama came. And that was a great regret. But it was a great pleasure to have you all at that Independence Day reception is fantastic. 

Amb. McCarthy: [00:54:03] Well, I want to thank you both. Thank you, Ben, and for your kind words. And thank you, Paul, for taking the time. Both of you, you are an incredible example of the kind of leadership it takes to advance our national security. And it is always wonderful to see that you actually became personal friends and the friendship continues long after you have moved into other senior leadership positions. So thank you. Thank you so much for for joining the podcast. 

Gen. Hodges: [00:54:32] Thank you both. 

Amb. Jones: [00:54:33] Thank you, Deborah.

Amb. McCarthy: [00:54:36] This has been a new episode in the series, the general and the Ambassador. A Conversation. Thank you so much for listening. The series is a production of the American Academy of Diplomacy. This podcast was produced with the support of Dataminr, a leading artificial intelligence platform that delivers real time breaking news alerts to help you make critical decisions and respond with speed and confidence. You can find our podcasts on all major podcast sites and on our website General Ambassador Podcast dot org. Do follow us on Twitter and Facebook. We welcome all input and suggestions. You can email us directly at General Ambassador Podcast at gmail.com.